Author: Jacob Surpin
April 29 marks the 20th anniversary of the 1992 Los Angeles Civil Unrest, an event catalyzed by the acquittal of three of the four LAPD officers responsible for the 1991 beating of Rodney King. Much of the coverage of the anniversary has centered around whether or not such unrest could happen again, yet this type of yes-or-no analysis limits the discussion regarding the ongoing development of South-Central Los Angeles. Rather than providing a moment for disengaged analysis, the 20th anniversary should instead serve as an opportunity to understand the current needs of South-Central Los Angeles. Numerous problems still remain that post-unrest legislation and community development efforts failed to adequately address, largely because private companies resisted moving into the area. Yet this resistance may be changing. An influx of Latinos has resulted in an increase in the region’s purchasing power and labor force, which has begun to lure developers and retailers to the area. Now is the time for policymakers to aggressively pursue economic incentives for local businesses, and the crafting of these policies would benefit by an extensive analysis of the failures of past legislation.
South-Central Los Angeles had become a powder keg of discontent by the early 1990s; the fuse that would light it came in the form of the acquittal of three LAPD officers who had been caught on tape brutally beating Rodney King. The area was stricken by poverty, had unemployment rates as high as 25 percent among young black men and felt the daily volatility of an oppressive police force. Unable to ignore their feelings of illegitimacy and second class citizenship any longer, the people of South Los Angeles took to the streets the night of the acquittal, and the ultimate result was a four-day period of dangerous civil unrest that decimated much of Los Angeles. Rather than an act of mindless violence and rioting as some have suggested, the civil unrest was a legitimate form of political protest carried out by those with no other options. Yet while the civil unrest certainly helped spur lawmakers to action, it also helped form and solidify a public perception of the area as unsafe – in other words, a poor spot for investment. And this perception, unfortunately, doomed most of the efforts of policymakers in the 1990s.
Mayor Tom Bradley and Governor Pete Wilson announced Rebuild L.A. – one of the first and most public responses to the civil unrest – before the four-day civil unrest had even ended, and the failures of the organization should be taken into account in the formation of future policy. An effort to utilize the supposed power of the private sector, Rebuild L.A. became a nonprofit corporation that made quite a few pronouncements but achieved very few results. Yet they were not entirely to blame in all of their failures – victims of chance, they succeeded in getting a commitment from the Vons supermarket chain to build 12 new stores in the district only to have the company back out of the agreement. Rebuild L.A. concluded in 1997 as a severe disappointment, but the organization had at least some of the correct goals in mind; future legislation must focus on generating an increase in supermarkets and a decrease in liquor stores.
Additionally, both the federal government and the city unsuccessfully sought to use the concept of empowerment zones – providing economic incentives for businesses to operate or open in certain areas – to encourage economic development, an example of well intended policy that deserves to be updated for the current climate. As the author Josh Sides has noted in a recent essay for Design Observer, “Probably no combination of tax incentives and favorable loan terms would have spurred investment in an area perceived to be rife with crime and prone to riots.” The empowerment zones failed, along with most other policy put forth by the city, in that it simply could not gain traction in the area’s dismal economic climate. This climate, however, has changed for the better over the past twenty years, and city government should be proactive with future policy in the area. And in doing so, officials must look to old (and mostly failed) policy as models – not as limiting factors in the discussion, but as resources of information to be utilized.
After the biggest changes in South-Central have come about without any direct policy intervention, the area now has the economic stability to make good on future policy. The 1990 Census reported that Latinos comprised 45.5 percent of the population of South Los Angeles. By 2010, that number grew to 66.3 percent, and the percentage of African-Americans in the area has fallen accordingly. While these changes in demographics have disrupted the coherence of traditionally black communities, the influx of Latinos has been economically advantageous to the area. And developers and retailers have begun to respond by investing in areas they would have deemed too dangerous just two decades ago. Rather than asking whether the riots could happen again, legislators would be better served thinking about how to best augment the self-transformation of South Los Angeles.
While the demographics of the area have shifted, several needs of the community have stayed the same. The old calling cards of the progressive left in Los Angeles – building policy around reducing liquor stores in the area, increasing supermarkets and other food options, and providing incentives for local businesses – have not been exhausted and must be revisited. By the 20th anniversary of the 1992 Civil Unrest, South Los Angeles may finally have the economic heft to take advantage of aggressive policies, and an analysis of the failed policies of the 1990s have valuable insights to contribute to the discussion.
Jacob Surpin is a sophomore ECLS major. He can be reached at surpin@oxy.edu.
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