Author: Eric Gullicksen
Muammar Gaddafi, referred to by the Kavkaz Center as the “Leader and Guide of the Revolution of Libya” for over 40 years, now faces a revolutionary movement that aims to remove him from power. In January, a series of protests over government corruption and the lack of civil liberties were met in typical strong-arm fashion with arrests and threats of violence.
The situation escalated in February as hundreds of protesters took to the streets and government forces violently dispersed them. Soon after, police and military buildings were set on fire. Within 10 days of large-scale civil protests (Feb. 15 to Feb. 25), opposition forces had taken control of the majority of the country.
By March 15, the tide had turned and the rebels were left with only a few small strongholds. NATO forces implemented a no-fly zone and started bombing Gaddafi’s forces. Despite the introduction of coalition air power, the opposition currently only possesses the ability to pester Qaddafi’s forces, and they cannot penetrate deeply into government controlled territory with lasting success.
If an effective ground campaign is the goal, the coalition needs to supply rebels with rifles, ammunition and other military supplies.
The bombing campaign in Libya was initially extremely successful, which is a testament to the power of the Western war machine. A few days after the creation of a U.N.-mandated no-fly zone over Libya, the rebels had reclaimed a great deal of territory lost to the government counter-offensive. A no-fly zone means government planes and helicopters can’t take to the air because coalition forces will shoot them down.
Coalition planes also targeted heavy armor formations and airfields with precision-guided munitions, and tomahawk missiles were fired at military installations all over the country. Clearly, the West has come down firmly on the side of the rebels and should take the additional step of directly arming the forces battling Gaddafi.
However, there currently exists a kind of air-to-ground siege, as Gaddafi’s forces are now hiding within civilian populations, and NATO forces cannot directly engage the enemy. They have adapted, deviated from the Western script, realizing that staying in the open is tantamount to suicide. If there’s anything America has learned about armed conflict in the last 10 years, it is that air power alone is often incapable of winning wars.
With the air war stalled, on a tactical level this has become a highly mobile, dispersed conflict between infantry forces. According to a top opposition official quoted in a New York Times article on April 7, 2011, the contingent of defected ex-military and police, likely to carry the brunt of any significant offensive thrust, is “still waiting for armament, only some of them are at the front lines supporting the young men.” If there’s one plentiful thing in the region (besides oil), it is firearms. It is not a problem of scarcity but rather of distribution.
10 thousand extra rifles in Libya won’t make a difference in the wrong hands; there are already a hundred times that many in the wrong hands. If the Libyan rebels were to acquire them, however, it could turn the tide of the conflict. There are a number of former Soviet Bloc countries that would be happy to unload AK-47s on the cheap. Along with ammunition, the coalition could also provide medical supplies and meals ready to eat. Months worth of this would cost less than the maintenance and fuel required for a few days of air sorties. Economically, this is clearly the most prudent course for the U.S. and coalition to pursue.
Thankfully, there are only a handful of Central Intelligence Agency operatives evaluating the situation on the ground in Libya, and it is unlikely that American ground combat troops will be deployed. It’s up to the people of Libya to see it through, but seeing as the U.S. has already spent millions of dollars and dropped hundreds of bombs, it may as well go as far as it reasonably can and supply opposition forces with the essential materials necessary for victory.
Total territorial control by the rebels may not be necessary — given enough hammering, the regime could crumble from the inside. Even without more clear military victories, any added pressure on government forces should precipitate a negotiated solution more rapidly, saving civilian and military lives. This should hopefully satisfy U.N. officials who urge policy-makers to remember the official mission: protecting civilians, not affecting regime change. Pundits and policymakers generally seem to think that the latter will lead to the former. What the result of a negotiated solution would finally look like for the Libyan people and America at this stage is mere prophecy, and a point of contention in itself.
Eric Gullicksen is a senior philosophy major. He can be reached at gullicksen@oxy.edu
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